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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant rejects the traditional metaphysical – i.e., the ontological, 
cosmological and physico-theological (or teleological) – proofs for God’s existence.1 In the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that our duties are not grounded in 
the divine will, but solely in the moral law (GMS IV:431).
2
 Otherwise, morality would be 
based on religion, which would amount to theological morality and heteronomy. Hence, faith 
in God seems to be no requisite for a virtuous life and atheism seems to be compatible with 
morality within Kant’s philosophy. Yet, in many of his other works, including the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Critique of Judgment, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and 
his lesser known Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, Kant argues that 
‘morality leads inevitably to religion’ (KPV V:125; RGV VI:6) and insists that faith in God is 
necessary for the intelligibility of the possibility of the highest good as the final end of the 
moral law. Furthermore, Kant condemns atheism on moral grounds arguing that – by rejecting 
the idea of God as a sufficient cause of the highest good – it rules out additional religious 
incentives to morality (KRV A 812 / B 841),
3
 leads to moral despair, weakens respect for the 
moral law, damages the moral disposition (KU V:540), and has a pernicious influence on 
society by causing social disorder (WDO VIII:146) and by robbing citizens of incentives to 
morality viewed as commanded and enforced by God (V-MS/Vigilantius XXVII:531).4 This 
paper particularly seeks to explore (1) Kant’s moral criticism in the Critique of Judgment that 
atheism leads to moral despair by lacking the cognitively determinate and psychological 
reassuring view offered by rational faith for rendering the possibility of the highest good, i.e., 
the harmonious and proportionate union of virtue and happiness, intelligible, and (2) the 
rational, non-theistic alternatives that atheists can embrace for upholding the possibility of the 
highest good. Before tackling these issues, I shall start by offering a brief analysis of Kant’s 
defence of moral theism and his conception of atheism. 
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KANT’S MORAL THEISM 
 
Kant describes moral theism as faith in God based on morality, viz. ‘a conviction of the 
existence of God on practical grounds’ (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1151).5 In comparison to 
deism, moral theism ‘does not think of God according to nature, but according to morality’ 
and thus conceives God as ‘the lawgiver in the realm of morals’ (V-Th/Volckmann 
XXVIII:1152),
6
 ‘the author of our moral laws’, ‘the ruler of the world’ – and not merely as 
the ‘author’ of the world (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1002). Kant distinguishes faith (Glaube) 
from both knowledge (Wissen) and opinion (Meinung). Although having an opinion, believing 
and knowing all involve the ‘subjective validity of judgment’ or ‘taking something to be true’, 
Kant distinguishes them as follows: 
 
Having an opinion is taking something to be true with the consciousness that it is 
subjectively as well as objectively insufficient. If taking something to be true is only 
subjectively sufficient and is at the same time held to be objectively insufficient, then it 
is called believing. Finally, when taking something to be true is both subjectively and 
objectively sufficient it is called knowing. Subjective sufficiency is called conviction 
(for myself), objective sufficiency, certainty (for everyone). (KRV A 822 / B 850)
7
   
 
Whereas knowledge can count on ‘certainty’ or ‘objective sufficiency’, i.e., valid theoretical 
grounds, faith or belief can only rely on ‘conviction’ or ‘subjective sufficiency’, i.e., valid 
practical grounds. Faith thus requires having valid practical grounds for holding something to 
be true, whereas it lacks valid theoretical grounds for doing so. Although practical arguments 
are insufficient to claim that we know that there is a God, they do provide us with ‘moral 
certainty’ that God exists (KRV A 828–30 / B 856–8). This moral certainty rests on an 
entirely personal basis: ‘I must not even say “It is morally certain that there is a God,” etc., 
but rather “I am morally certain” etc.’ (KRV A 829 / B 857). Furthermore, Kant holds that 
speculative arguments cannot undermine moral faith in God (KPV V:134, 143) for our faith is 
‘unshakeable, and it can never be overthrown, not even if all mankind united to undermine it’ 
(V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1011).
8
 The moral theist thus   
 
needs no speculative proofs of the existence of God; he is convinced [überzeugt] of it 
with certainty, because otherwise he would have to reject the necessary laws of morality 
which are grounded in the nature of his being.
9
 Thus he derives theology from morality, 
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yet not from speculative but from practical evidence; i.e. not though knowledge but 
from faith. (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1012)  
 
Kant uses a distinctly moral view of God.
10
 Kant depicts God as punishing evil and rewarding 
good (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1085).
11
 In addition to the scholastic attributes of 
omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence, Kant ascribes to God the moral attributes of 
holiness, beneficence, and justice (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1012, 1073–5).12  Kant views 
God not only as the ‘moral legislator’ and ‘author of the moral law’ (V-MS/Vigilantius 
XXVII:530),
13
 but also as the ‘personification’ of that law (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1076, 
1091)
14
 or as ‘personified morality’ (V-MP/Dohna XXVIII:700).15 God is a moral ‘person’ 
(OP XXI:9–10)16, i.e. a purely rational being that – in contrast to man – always lives up to the 
moral law and hence embodies this law as it were. God is particularly ‘a person to which all 
human duties are at the same time the commands of this person’ (OP XXII:119).17 Hence, 
Kant emphasizes that all our moral duties can be regarded as ‘divine commands’ (KPV V:129; 
RGV VI:153, OP XXII:120). God is also the only being that is capable of scrutinizing and 
fathoming the ‘intelligible ground of the heart’, i.e., all maxims of man’s power of choice 
[Willkur] and his moral dispositions, and hence of distinguishing between who is virtuous, 
prudent, or vicious (RGV VI:48). Finally, Kant views God as being concerned with the 
realisation of the highest good, i.e., the harmonious union of maximal virtue and proportionate 
happiness, and the exact harmony of the realm of nature (Reich der Natur), i.e., the world as it 
is according to mechanical laws of nature, and the realm of ends (Reich der Zwecke), i.e., the 
world as it ought to be according to moral laws of freedom (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1116).
18
 
God thus has a moral plan for mankind (KPV V:125; KU V:450). Faith in God guarantees us 
that our moral endeavours are not in vain, viz. that they necessarily produce their intended 
good ends, and that if we do what we can and ought to do in approximating the highest good, 
God will complete our task (KU V:450–3; RGV VI:74–7, 98, 192, 201–2).19       
Kant’s practical arguments in favour of rational faith in God – as elaborated in the second 
Critique (KPV V:110–14, 124–46)20 – are directed to the possibility of the highest good. 
Kant’s argument starts from the unquestionable validity of the moral law as a fact of reason. 
This law commands categorically through reason. If the moral law commands us to pursue the 
highest good as the final end, we have to do so and the highest good has to be possible (KPV 
V:57). If this were not to be the case, we would not act rationally – for rational agency entails 
that if we intend an end by our agency, it should be possible to realise this end – and the moral 
law that commands us to seek this end would be invalid. However, given our finite (physical) 
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capacities and the amoral nature of the world, which does not systematically connect virtue 
with proportionate happiness, it remains unclear how we are to establish the highest good. Yet, 
if there were an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent author of the world who is at the same 
time a holy, beneficent and just world ruler, i.e., God according to moral theism, such a being 
could supplement our limited endeavours and complete the realisation of the highest good. 
Since theoretical reason cannot demonstrate the impossibility of God’s existence and rational 
faith in God does not conflict with theoretical reason, we are justified in assuming the 
existence of God (KPV 135–43). Moreover, Kant argues that rational faith in God is the only 
cognitive pathway for understanding how the highest good is to be brought about. Hence, he 
concludes that we have to believe in God (KPV V:125–6, 142–6). Faith in God is thus 
grounded in the necessity of being able to think the possibility of the highest good so that we 
can rationally execute the commands of the moral law.
21
 Precisely for this reason, Kant argues 
that faith in God is morally necessary and that morality inevitably leads to religion (KPV 
V:125, RGV VI:6) in this sense that religion, while not being necessary for grounding the 
principles of morality, is necessary for rendering the completion of the final object of morality 
intelligible. Consequently, Kant contends that if one doubts the possibility of God’s existence, 
one has to give up the highest good and consequently ‘hold all moral laws for empty 
imagination’ (R XVIII:556).22  
 
KANT’S VIEWS ON ATHEISM 
 
Throughout his different Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion and Reflexionen, 
Kant discusses two kinds of atheism: sceptical atheism or ‘Ohnegötterei’ and dogmatic 
atheism or ‘Gottesläugnung’ (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:171).23 Whereas the sceptical atheist 
denies all knowledge (Erkenntnis) and conviction (Überzeugung) of God’s existence and thus 
rejects all (speculative) proofs for God’s existence (Dasein), the dogmatic atheist denies the 
possibility of (the concept of the existence) of God itself (R XVIII:520)
24
 and contends that 
‘there is no God’ (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1171).25 In other words, ‘the dogmatic atheist 
(the denier of God) denies the possibility [of God’s existence], the sceptical atheist (the one 
who is without Godship) denies all evidence of [God’s] existence. The former [denies] the 
concept, the latter [denies] the ground of proof’ (R XVIII:541).26 The sceptical atheist thus 
considers speculative arguments as insufficient for proving God’s existence (V-
Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1175).
27
 Yet, at the same time, he also recognises that such arguments 
fail to prove that God does not exist (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1151).
28
 For this reason, Kant 
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argues that the sceptical atheist can be convinced to adopt rational faith in God on the basis of 
moral considerations (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1175).
29
 In spite of the insufficiency of 
speculative proofs of God’s existence, Kant thinks that we cannot doubt God’s existence for 
this reason for we still have ‘practical proofs’ (V-Th/Baumbach XXVIII:1257).  The sceptical 
atheist thus regards God not merely as a logical but as a real possibility from a practical point 
of view and as a speculatively permissible and morally necessary hypothesis ‘since the moral 
laws find a surer entry thereby, and are more easily followed’ (V-MS/Vigilantius XXVII:530). 
By contrast, the dogmatic atheist radically denies the existence of God: he regards it neither as 
a logical, nor as a real possibility.   
Furthermore, Kant contends that only the dogmatic atheist is to be contrasted to the moral 
theist (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1010)
30
 arguing that the sceptical atheist ‘can still have 
religion, because he sincerely admits that it is even more impossible to prove that there is no 
God than to prove that there is one. […] Now the belief in a merely possible God as ruler of 
the world is obviously the minimum of theology’ (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1010). 31 
Although the sceptical atheist denies all knowledge of God’s existence, he assumes the 
possibility of God on the basis of moral considerations and conducts himself as if there is a 
God so that he is religious after all (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1151). Kant thus assumes that 
a sceptical atheist, while being an atheist from a speculative point of view, can be a moral 
theist from a practical point of view: ‘Atheism can reside in mere speculation, while in 
practice [Praxis] such a person can be a theist or venerator of God’ (V-Mo/Collins 
XXVII:312).
32
 The sceptical atheist can thus have religion by adopting moral theism on 
practical grounds. In fact, given Kant’s philosophical views on the existence of God as 
defended throughout his entire mature oeuvre and lectures, Kant himself is a ‘sceptical 
atheist’ from the standpoint of theoretical reason, i.e., one who stays unconvinced by the 
theoretical arguments for God’s existence, but who is open to positing this existence if it in 
fact proves necessary to conceive the realisability of the highest good, a condition which Kant 
firmly asserts and which makes him therefore a ‘moral theist’ from the standpoint of practical 
reason. Kant’s own position thus also implies that the only kind of theism that is at all 
intellectually honest and respectable is ‘moral theism’, never ‘dogmatic’ or ‘theoretical 
theism’.33 
In comparison to the sceptical atheist, Kant thinks that the dogmatic atheist commits a crucial 
intellectual error by denying God’s existence: the dogmatic atheist claims to know that God 
does not exist, which is impossible according to Kant. The dogmatic atheist has to prove a 
priori that God does not exist by showing that the concept of God itself contradicts itself in 
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the union of its predicates (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1171–2). Although Kant recognises that 
an a priori proof of God’s existence is not possible because of our incapability to have insight 
into how a synthesis of all possible perfections may be possible, he argues against the 
dogmatic atheist that – because of the same lack of insight – ‘it is also impossible for human 
reason ever to prove that such a combination of all perfections in one thing is not possible’ 
(V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1025–6). Hence, Kant concludes: 
 
Reason itself is not able to prove with apodictic certainty any such possibility [of God]. 
For this would require an insight which far transcends the bounds of the human faculty 
of reason. But from this same inability of my reason follows the impossibility of ever 
proving that a most perfect being is not possible. And thus collapses the edifice of the 
dogmatic atheist. For if he wishes to deny God’s existence and assert that there 
absolutely is no God, the atheist must first demonstrate the impossibility of God. But 
here reason forsakes him, and everything he may bring against the possibility of God 
will be only so much absurdity and nonsense. (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1026).
34
   
 
Although speculative arguments cannot establish that God exists, they can thus neither 
establish that God does not exist. Moreover, it is cognitively legitimate to assume the 
possibility of God’s existence and the moral theist finds in pure practical reason convincing 
moral grounds for embracing faith in God and affirming his existence. The dogmatic atheist, 
on the other hand, commits an intellectual error in denying the possibility of God’s existence 
for he claims to know the unknowable and to be able to prove a priori the improvable.
35
  
Kant’s theoretical rejection of dogmatic atheism also affects his moral view of it. Kant 
concludes that dogmatic atheists are morally evil and that their will is corrupted for they 
affirm that God does not exist while they ought to recognise that they have no ground for 
doing so. In this respect, Kant once again contrasts the sceptical with the dogmatic atheist. 
From a moral point of view, sceptical atheists are far better off than dogmatic atheists for the 
former ‘who have fallen into atheism through speculation should not be so readily condemned 
for wickedness […]; only their understanding was corrupted, not their will’ (italics added) (V-
Mo/Collins XXVII:311).
36
 Kant thus reasons that if the ‘logical ground’ for atheism does not 
hold, the dogmatic atheist thus ‘denies God from wantonness [muthwillig] and lack of respect 
for the better conviction’ and thus embraces a ‘moral ground’ for his atheism (V-PP/Herder 
XXVII:11).
37
 In the next section, I shall examine one specific kind of ‘wickedness of the 
heart’, viz. abandoning the highest good and lapsing into moral despair.  
7 
 
 
KANT’S MORAL DESPAIR ARGUMENT: ANALYSIS AND REPLY 
 
Kant’s criticism that atheism leads to moral despair is most fiercely expressed in the Critique 
of Judgment, where Kant conceives of ‘a righteous man’ who is convinced that there is no 
God and who would merely unselfishly try to establish the highest good (KU 5:452). Yet, so 
Kant argues, 
 
his effort is limited; and from nature he can, to be sure, expect some contingent 
assistance here and there, but never a lawlike agreement in accordance with constant 
rules […] with the ends to act in behalf of which he feels himself bound and impelled. 
Deceit, violence, and envy will always surround him, even though he is himself honest, 
peaceable, and benevolent; and the righteous ones besides himself that he will still 
encounter will, in spite of all their worthiness to be happy, nevertheless be subject by 
nature, which pays no attention to that, to all the evils of poverty, illnesses, and 
untimely death, […] and will always remain thus until one wide grave engulfs them all 
together (whether honest or dishonest, it makes no difference here) and flings them […] 
back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were drawn. – 
The end, therefore, which this well-intentioned person had and should have had before 
his eyes in his conformity to the moral law, he would certainly have to give up as 
impossible; or, if he would remain attached to the appeal of his inner moral vocation 
and not weaken the respect, by which the moral law immediately influences him to 
obedience, by the nullity of the only idealistic final end that is adequate to its high 
demand (which cannot occur without damage to the moral disposition), then he must 
assume the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e., of God, from a practical point 
of view, i.e., in order to form a concept of at least the possibility of the final end that is 
prescribed to him by morality. (KU 5:452-3) 
 
Marina echoes Kant’s argument that the moral subject rejecting faith in God ‘would 
eventually have to collapse in despair’ as follows:  
 
For she would have to believe that she, and other individuals like her, were engaged in a 
project that, irrespective of its moral worth, was doomed to failure. Battling against a 
hostile and indifferent universe whose cataclysmic upheavals consume the just and the 
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unjust alike, […] she could only conclude that death and the chaos of nature will 
eventually claim her and all others like her. Not to grasp the horror of the inevitable 
annihilation that a purposeless nature poses to a moral yet finite individual could only be 
an intentional blindness. It is to continue to engage in a battle towards the acquisition of 
virtue, the inevitable outcome of which is known beforehand; as such, it is to display the 
courage of a fool. If she reasons correctly, she will see that given the premise that she is 
merely the product of a blind and chaotic nature, the moral law […] would thus have 
been exposed as an idle and fantastic dream.
38
 
 
As we shall see, Kant makes several seemingly interconnected but highly questionable claims 
presented in some kind of slippery slope argument. Kant’s argument can be reconstructed as 
follows. Its premises are: (P1) the amoral nature of the world, the failings and sufferings of 
the righteous and the futility of their moral endeavours offer no perspectives for establishing 
the highest good; (P2) moral theism offers the only concept, i.e., the existence of an 
omnipotent, intelligent and just moral world ruler, for rendering the possibility of the highest 
good intelligible; (P3) atheism rejects the concept described in (P2). Its main conclusions are: 
(C1) an atheist has to abandon the highest good; and (C2) atheism leads to moral despair. It is 
this argument that I challenge. My strategy consists in questioning and undercutting Kant’s 
premises as well as in distinguishing between an ‘ideal-transcendent’ account of the highest 
good as the proportionate and systematic union of virtue and happiness and a ‘historical-
immanent’ account of the highest good as the creation of a moral world characterised by 
happiness conditioned by virtue and morality, which will be far more appealing for even the 
most rabid atheist.  
Let us start with Kant’s third premise. Following Kant’s own account of atheism, this premise 
need not necessarily apply to the sceptical atheist. As we have seen, sceptical atheists can still 
recognise the possibility that God may exist on the basis of moral considerations and can thus 
conceive of at least one cognitively determinate pathway to be able to think the attainability 
of the highest good. Yet, as Denis rightly remarks, Kant’s account obscures ‘how skeptical 
atheism constitutes a distinct theological position’ by omitting the fact that ‘skeptical atheism 
implies neither a practical faith in God, nor a rejection of that faith’. In fact, Kant makes two 
mistakes, viz. (i) by presupposing that the sceptical atheist does actually accept God’s 
existence on the basis of moral considerations and thus by positing an equivalence between 
assuming the possibility of God and affirming the existence of God, and (ii) by omitting the 
distinction between sceptical atheists ‘who embrace faith in God, and those who do not – i.e., 
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those who live with the recognition that God may exist, without themselves affirming that 
God does exist.’ 39  Sceptical atheists may thus recognise that God might exist without 
affirming God’s existence on the basis of moral considerations. Kant’s third premise therefore 
only applies to those sceptical atheists who cannot be convinced by moral considerations to 
affirm faith in God’s existence, and to dogmatic atheists.   
Let us now consider Kant’s second premise. Is Kant right in arguing that moral faith in (the 
idea of) God as a just world ruler provides the only concept for embracing the possibility of 
the highest good? If we could conceive non-theistic, moral-teleological accounts that render 
the highest good intelligible, the atheist would not have to abandon the possibility of the 
highest good. Indeed, while denying the existence of God, an atheist can still commit 
himself – because of the authority of the moral law directing an agent to pursue the highest 
good – to embrace some non-theistic, moral-teleological schema that suffices to be able to 
think the possibility of the highest good. An atheist can assume an intelligent, rational world 
order through which a moral teleology necessary for establishing the highest good can be 
presupposed. For example, Fichte holds that the morally well-disposed subject believes that 
the world in which he acts is in conformity with his moral actions without believing in (the 
idea of) a personal and transcendent God over and above this impersonal, rational and 
teleological world order. Theravada Buddhism embraces the concept of karma as a moral-
teleological mechanism that is operative in nature and that lets us think a harmony of virtue 
and happiness but that does not appeal to a God. By analogy, an atheist may dismiss moral 
theism and yet ground the possibility of the highest good in some (unknown) moral-
teleological mechanism in nature through which the natural and the moral world are brought 
into harmony and through which the highest good will be attained by virtue of moral agency. 
A drawback to such an account seems to be that it is less cognitively determinate and specific 
than Kant’s moral theism regarding the precise mechanism of how the highest good is to be 
brought about. Yet, as Byrne notices, avoiding commitment to ‘metaphysical assumptions 
containing rich pictures of the possible mechanism behind moral teleology is more “Critical” 
than Kant’s own apparatus of postulates.’40 Hence, an atheist embracing the possibility of a 
non-theistic conception of the realisation of the highest good need not necessarily succumb 
into moral despair.  
Moreover, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant himself seems to consider the possibility 
of a non-theistic, natural-teleological conception of the realisation of the highest good: 
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I said above that in accordance with a mere course of nature in the world happiness in 
exact conformity with moral worth is not to be expected and is to be held impossible, 
and that therefore the possibility of the highest good […] can be granted only on the 
presupposition of a moral author in the world. […] In fact, the impossibility referred to 
is merely subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to conceive, in the mere 
course of nature, a connection so exactly proportioned and thoroughly purposive 
between events occurring in the world in accordance with such different laws, although, 
as with everything else in nature that is purposive, it nevertheless cannot prove – that is, 
set forth sufficiently on objective grounds – the impossibility of it in accordance with 
universal laws of nature. (KPV V:145)  
 
Kant thus argues that – objectively speaking – there are two equal possibilities for conceiving 
the highest good: moral theism and natural teleology. He concedes that objective grounds for 
the possibility that nature itself provides the unification of virtue and happiness in accordance 
with its own natural laws cannot be ruled out. However, so Kant argues, since human reason 
is not capable of fathoming in detail how the latter possibility has to be conceived, he 
concludes that there are compelling subjective grounds for human reason to dispense with this 
possibility and to prefer the theistic conception of how the highest good is to be brought about:  
 
But as for the way we are to represent this possibility [of the highest good], whether in 
accordance with universal laws of nature without a wise author presiding over nature or 
only on the supposition of such an author, reason cannot decide this objectively. Now a 
subjective condition of reason enters into this, the only way in which it is theoretically 
possible for it to think the exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm of 
morals as the condition of the possibility of the highest good, and at the same time the 
only way that is conducive to morality. (KPV V:145) 
 
Both moral theism and natural teleology are thus two objectively equal ways to represent the 
possibility of the highest good. The difference between these two options is that the latter is 
cognitively less determinate and specific: it falls beyond the scope of our reason to conceive 
how natural teleological laws may establish an exact proportion of happiness and virtue, 
whereas faith in God as moral world ruler does seem to provide us with a more vivid and 
concrete account of the possibility of such a harmony. Kant thus concludes that human beings 
will prefer moral theism for conceiving the possibility of the highest good because the 
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postulate of God is subjectively more comprehensible to our human cognitive faculties than a 
view according to which the highest good would be in conformity with mere laws of nature.
41
 
Yet, it is important to keep in mind that Kant himself concedes the validity of appealing to a 
natural teleological world order as an objective alternative for considering the possibility of 
the highest good without appealing to a supersensible entity. As such, Kant implicitly 
provides the atheist with a non-theistic account for affirming the possibility of the highest 
good. And although Kant thinks that moral theism is subjectively more attractive or 
persuasive for human reason by offering a more specific and determinate account of how the 
highest good may be brought about, he has no conclusive objective arguments for tipping the 
balance in favour of moral theism.  
However, appealing to some non-theistic, metaphysical schemes such as a teleological world 
order for guaranteeing the possibility of the highest good may be a leap to far for some radical 
atheists as it still relies on some kind of metaphysical faith. Moreover, an atheist may also 
advocate a Darwinian view on nature and reject the existence of a teleological world order. 
Yet, even such atheists can still uphold the possibility of the highest good by adopting the 
moderate epistemic stance that – in spite of what Kant thinks – the impossibility of the highest 
good is not sufficiently or objectively proven and hence recognise – because of their 
commitment to the moral law – that the highest good is something valuable to be pursued. As 
long as there is no sufficient, objective proof for the impossibility of the highest good, there is 
no reason to regard our moral efforts for realising it as irrational, especially if it is our well-
considered free and rational choice to put great value on this moral ideal. This sceptical 
rationality claim yields a stance that is genuinely ‘critical’ and that is more consistent with 
present-day scientific insights and growing secular pluralism in ethics.  
The idea that it is not irrational to pursue the highest good as long as its impossibility is not 
proven is not unfamiliar to Kant’s philosophy. Both in On the Common Saying and the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant contends that in the case of an end set as a duty it suffices that 
its possibility is not demonstrably impossible in order to render its pursuit rational.
42
 In On the 
Common Saying, he argues that the thought that a moral end has not yet been realised and for 
this reason will probably be never realised does not in itself justify to abandon this end ‘as 
long as its achievement is not demonstrably impossible’ (TP VIII:309–10). Kant thus argues 
that if an end is morally valuable, the absence of proof of the impossibility of it suffices to 
render our efforts in its behalf rational. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that our 
duty consists in acting in accordance with the idea of a moral end ‘even if there is not the least 
theoretical probability that it can be achieved, as long as its impossibility cannot be 
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demonstrated either’ (MS VI:354). Once more, Kant contends that if it is a duty to achieve an 
end, all that is needed to make the pursuit of that end rational is not a guarantee that it can be 
achieved, but rather the absence of a demonstration that it cannot be achieved. The idea that 
rational agency directed to pursuing an end set as a duty only requires that the impossibility of 
the end is not proven – rather than that its possibility has to be proven by postulating God as 
moral world ruler – provides the atheist with a genuine and rationally stable alternative to 
moral theism in order not the abandon the highest good. 
However, in defence of Kant, it might be argued that the atheist’s approach keeps it dangling 
how the systematicity and proportionality of virtue and happiness as core feature of the 
highest good can be guaranteed. Although it suffices to be convinced that the attainment of 
the highest good is not per se impossible in order to be able to rationally pursue it, one might 
question whether such an approach suffices for conceiving a systematic and necessary 
harmony – instead of a merely contingent aggregate – of virtue and happiness in the highest 
good. It is precisely this feature of systematicity that Kant thinks a righteous atheist like 
Spinoza lacks in conceptualising the possibility of the highest good. Yet, as we shall see, there 
are also strands in Kant’s philosophy that do not primarily emphasise this systematic and 
proportionate union of virtue and happiness, but rather advocate an account of the highest 
good as a moral world of virtue and happiness conditioned by morality. Furthermore, we can 
stick to the argument that as long as there is no proof for the impossibility per se of some 
harmonious system of virtue and happiness, there is no reason to conclude that we act 
irrationally in striving for such a system. With respect to the question of how such a system 
might be conceived and thought, it seems that Kant’s ethico-theology provides us with a 
cognitively determinate and – perhaps above all – a psychologically reassuring, hence 
subjectively more attractive view on the realisability of the highest good:  
 
The cognition of God must therefore complete morality, but it must not first determine 
whether something is morally good or a duty for me! This I must judge from the nature 
of things in accordance with a possible system of ends; and I must be just as certain of it 
as I am that a triangle has three angles. But in order to provide my heart with conviction, 
weight and emphasis, I have need of a God who will make me participate in happiness 
in accordance with these eternal and unchangeable laws, if I am worthy of it. (italics 
added) (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz XXVIII:1116–7)43 
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Let us proceed with another consideration in undercutting Kant’s moral despair argument 
against atheism. If Kant were really to succeed in arguing that moral theism offers the only 
pathway for guaranteeing the possibility of the highest good, he would also have to prove its 
impossibility in case of a lack of faith. But Kant has no real sufficient, objective arguments for 
this. This is where Kant’s first premise comes in. In fact, Kant relies mainly on empirical or 
subjective evidence according to which the world’s amoral nature and the failures and 
sufferings of the righteous rule out the success of man’s moral actions, display their futility 
and prove the (empirical) impossibility of the highest good. Yet Kant’s evidence here is 
rooted in a pessimistic anthropological worldview, which is at odds with his optimistic beliefs 
about the final destiny of mankind in his Lectures on Ethics and On the Common Saying, 
where he argues that many proofs show that in the course of history the human race has made 
a substantial progress toward self-perfection (V-Mo/Collins XXVII:470–1; TP VIII:310). 
Surely, the world taken as a realm of nature is completely amoral and we cannot deny that we 
are faced with sufferings and failures even of the most virtuous and righteous people. But, 
contra Kant, I contend that there are enough reasons to be more optimistic in this regard. 
Despite all its cruelties, mankind’s history has also abundantly shown its moral successes, 
such as the abolition of slavery, the spreading of democratic regimes, the promotion of 
equality between men and women, the institution of international human rights organizations, 
the right to free public opinion and speech, and so on. As Denis rightly notes:  
 
despite Kant’s observations about the amoral nature of the world […], our day to day 
lives give us ample reason to see the world as amenable to our efforts. More often than 
not, what we intend to bring about through our morally-intended actions does come 
about. Even when things do not go as well as we would wish, we usually make things 
better than they would be if we had not tried.
44
  
 
Viewed as such, Kant’s first premise seems to be first and foremost rooted in a particular and 
pessimistic anthropological stanza and hence can neither appeal to universality, nor to 
objectivity. Moreover, in On the Common Saying, Kant himself recognises that ‘empirical 
evidence against the success of […] resolves undertaken on hope does not count for anything’ 
(TP VIII:309). Hence, an atheist who recognises that the impossibility of the highest good is 
not objectively proven and who is confident in the future, does not have to abandon the 
highest good and does not need to succumb into moral despair. Furthermore, as Wood points 
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out, Kant’s view that the amorality of the world and the suffering of the righteous yield moral 
despair is only provisional and hence limited:  
 
Such a despair must always be premature, in the sense that it is always beyond the 
power of a finite being to know absolutely that the world is destitute of moral goodness, 
that it provides no ground for the realization of his final end. His despair is always 
therefore a presumptuous judgment about the world. […] The uncertainty of the world 
and the finitude of his knowledge rather leave man suspended between hope and 
despair.
45
  
 
Although man’s natural condition may seem to exhaust hope, as Kant holds, it does not refute 
it altogether and there are ample counterexamples furnishing evidence that confidence in a 
morally better future is not unwarranted.   
Finally, dogmatic atheists may also bypass Kant’s ‘ideal-transcendent’ conception of the 
highest good as happiness proportionate to virtue and restrict themselves to Kant’s 
‘historical-immanent’ conception of the highest good as the creation of a moral world of 
virtue and happiness conditioned by morality, the possibility of which depends on human – 
but not divine – agency.46 The former account is ‘ideal-transcendent’ because it refers to the 
unconditioned final end of pure practical reason as a ‘mere object of thought’,47 and because 
the intelligibility of its realisation depends on assuming the existence of a moral world ruler 
and the immortality of the soul. Hence, it is also a ‘theistic’ account of the highest good. The 
latter account is ‘historical-immanent’ because it refers to a social end to be pursued 
collectively by the human race in this world over the course of history. Hence, it is also a 
‘non-theistic’ account of the highest good. While Kant’s ‘ideal-transcendent’ account as 
happiness in perfect proportion to virtue is predominant in his philosophy,
48
 some passages 
(TP VIII:279–80; RGV VI:5, 97–8; KU V:450, 453) suggest a ‘secular’, ‘historical-
immanent’ account of the highest good as ‘the existence of rational beings subject to moral 
laws’ (KU V:444) or, as Denis puts it, ‘a world of virtue, justice, and happiness, and 
flourishing rational capacities’.49 This account of the highest good does not so much stress the 
systematic proportionality between happiness and virtue, but rather happiness in conformity to 
or conditioned by moral agency and virtue. This account acknowledges the importance and 
necessity of happiness but makes its value dependent upon the morality of the maxims on 
which it is pursued.
50
 Hence, the realisation of the ‘historical-immanent’ highest good does 
not depend on the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and offers a more fruitful 
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account that is suitable to serve as the end of our autonomous moral conduct and that lies 
entirely within the scope of our human agency. Adopting this ‘historical-immanent’ account 
of the highest good provides even the most rabid atheist with a legitimate alternative to moral 
theism for affirming the possibility of the highest good and hence for resisting moral despair.     
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In spite of his rejection of the traditional metaphysical proofs of God’s existence, Kant 
defends moral theism, i.e. a subjective, rational conviction in the existence of God as a moral 
world ruler on behalf of the intelligibility of the highest good as the final end of the moral law. 
In the third Critique, Kant argues that atheism leads to moral despair by rejecting moral 
theism as the sole cognitively determinate and psychologically reassuring view for rendering 
the highest good intelligible. Yet an atheist can invoke different strategies for refuting Kant’s 
argument: (1) adopting some non-theistic, moral-teleological world conception through which 
the highest good can be conceived, (2) adopting a natural teleology through which nature 
itself is conceived as the ground for the highest good, (3) adopting the modest epistemological 
stance that striving for the highest good is not irrational as long as its impossibility is not 
sufficiently demonstrated, (4) showing that Kant has not objectively proven the impossibility 
of the highest good in case of a lack of faith in God, and (5) appealing to an alternative 
historical-immanent account of the highest good as the creation of a moral world of virtue and 
happiness conditioned by morality.
51
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